Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Arrangements, NBER-EASE Volume 6 by Shang-Jin Wei & Jeffrey A. Frankel
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Arrangements, NBER-EASE
Volume 6
Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, Eds.
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-38672-4
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_97-1
Publication Date: January 1997
Chapter Title: Open versus Closed Trade Blocs
Chapter Author: Shang-Jin Wei, Jeffrey A. Frankel
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8598
Chapter pages in book: (p. 119 - 140)5  Open versus Closed Trade Blocs 
Shang-Jin Wei and Jeffrey A. Frankel 
5.1  Introduction 
Against the general background of increasing regionalization of trade, there 
is renewed debate about the welfare implications of trade blocs. Recent theo- 
retical studies (e.g., Krugman 1991a; Frankel, Stein, and Wei  1995) have pro- 
vided intellectual support for the worry that the current pattern of trade region- 
alization is likely to be  welfare reducing relative to the preregionalization 
pattern because trade diversion is likely to outweigh trade creation. 
One possible condition on regionalism that may substantially reduce its cost 
and thus enhance the probability of  a welfare improvement is what is called 
“open regionalism.” The meaning of  the term is not entirely standardized. In 
this paper, we define an “open regional bloc” as one where, upon its formation, 
member countries choose to lower trade barriers to countries outside the bloc 
even if the degree of  extrabloc liberalization may not be as thorough as with 
respect to fellow member countries. 
We  have several objectives in this paper. First, we would like to clarify the 
meaning of the phrase “open regionalism.” Second, using a large, updated data 
set, we seek to examine degrees of  openness as well as intragroup biases in 
various trade blocs. Third, we investigate the effect of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) on trade and identify the degree to which previous results that did not 
take direct investment into account may need modification. 
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The organization of the paper is in line with the research plan outlined in 
the last paragraph. Section 5.2 provides an overview of the general issues. Sec- 
tion 5.3 explains the basic empirical framework and discusses degrees of  in- 
ward bias and openness in various trade blocs around the world. In section 5.4, 
we turn our attention to implicit continental trade blocs. In  section 5.5, we 
explore the connection between FDI and trade. And, finally, we  offer some 
concluding thoughts in section 5.6. 
5.2  An Overview of the Issues 
There are several stages in the intellectual discussion of  the desirability of 
regional trade blocs. The classical dichotomy between trade creation and diver- 
sion as advanced by Viner (1950) and Meade (1 955) and its modifications have 
dominated people’s thinking for many decades. It is clearly recognized that 
regional trade blocs have the potential to be welfare reducing. The actual wel- 
fare implications of a particular pattern of regionalization, it was thought, have 
to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
At the beginning of  the  199Os, parallel to a renewed interest in regional 
blocs in the policy world, a sudden and loud warning about the possibility of 
welfare deterioration was emitted in a simple and elegant paper by  Krugman 
(1991a). Using a model of  trade blocs based on preference for variety and 
increasing returns to scale, the author demonstrated through simulation that 
three blocs may be the worst scenario in a world with symmetric countries and 
no transport cost. Given the suspicion that the world is indeed moving toward 
a three-bloc pattern, this theoretical result seems particularly alarming. 
To counterbalance the fear, Krugman (1991b) soon supplied an equally in- 
genious if  somewhat extreme example in which three continental regional 
blocs may be welfare improving if intercontinental transport cost is very high. 
The intuition is simple: if transport cost is prohibitively high between conti- 
nents, then world trade will take place primarily between countries on the same 
continent even under global free trade. Therefore, a world network of continen- 
tal free trade blocs must be welfare improving since this is basically the best 
one can achieve in any case. For this reason, continental trade blocs are re- 
ferred to as “natural trade blocs” by Krugman, as opposed to “unnatural trade 
blocs”-that  is, free trade agreements between countries that are far apart. 
Of course, the real world is somewhere between zero transport cost (the first 
Krugman case) and infinite transport cost (the second Krugman case). Do the 
welfare implications of continental blocs depend monotonically on interconti- 
nental transport cost? If  so, is the transport cost in the real world above or 
below the threshold? 
Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995) have shown that the answer to the first ques- 
tion is yes: there is a threshold value of intercontinental transport cost, above 
which continental blocs are likely to be welfare improving and below which 
the reverse is true. Furthermore, the best estimate of the actual intercontinental 121  Open versus Closed Trade Blocs 
transport cost (about 15 percent of trade) is below the threshold. Hence, the 
current pattern of regionalization is likely to be excessive and welfare reducing. 
Frankel et al. call this type of continental bloc, which is nevertheless welfare 
subtracting, a “supernatural bloc.” 
It has been noted that if one allows neighboring countries to have comple- 
mentary resource endowment that is nearly complete for the countries as a 
group, then a system of regional blocs among neighbors can also be welfare 
improving (Deardorff and Stem 1994). This is a point well understood by  now. 
On the other hand, it is a strong assumption to make that the resource endow- 
ment of  neighboring countries is so nearly complete that they do not need to 
trade with outside countries.’ In any case, factor-endowment-based models do 
not seem to fit the bilateral trade data as well as a gravity model that ignores en- 
dowment. 
We  should note that the above discussion centers on static efficiency gains 
or losses. Dynamic gains (or losses) are often more important (Baldwin 1992). 
Finally, one can also evaluate the welfare implications of  regional blocs 
from the political economy angle. There is a debate about whether regional 
blocs have acted as stepping stones or stumbling blocks to global free trade 
(Bhagwati 1993; Lawrence 1996; Levy 1994; Wei and Frankel 1996). The is- 
sue is not resolved yet. 
The concept of open regionalism was formally introduced during Asian Pa- 
cific Economic Cooperation (APEC) discussions. It is thought to entail a struc- 
ture that minimizes trade diversion. The term at first sight is an oxymoron. 
Regionalism is a departure from the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle be- 
cause it discriminates in favor of members at the expense of nonmembers. How 
can it be open at the same time? 
To clarify, let us entertain four possible definitions of open regionalism. 
1. Open membership. Entry rules are transparent so that any country cur- 
rently outside the bloc can choose to join the bloc as long as it satisfies the 
entry criteria. The extremist version of open membership does not permit cur- 
rent members to veto the entry of any eligible newcomer. Of course, almost no 
existing regional bloc has this degree of open membership. A weaker version 
of open membership requires agreement among existing members (using una- 
nimity, majority vote, or some such voting rule) whenever a new member is to 
be admitted. 
2. Selective liberalization and open benefits. Member countries can focus on 
liberalizing, on an  MFN basis, those sectors in which they dominate world 
trade so that they do not need to have preferential treatment versus nonmember 
countries. In  the context of APEC, an influential observer noted that APEC 
“could avoid preferential treatment altogether on some issues, perhaps includ- 
1. Haveman (1992) derived a model that marries endowment consideration with differentiated 
product consideration. He found in his simulation that the negative effects of regional trade blocs 
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ing competition policy and new industrial standards. It could do so when liber- 
alizing in  sectors where the APEC countries dominate world trade, such as 
computers” (Bergsten 1994, 24). 
3. Nonprohibition  clause. A  regional  trade  agreement  can  automatically 
allow any member country to liberalize unilaterally, in particular, to extend the 
benefits of a regional agreement to nonmember countries. For example, Mex- 
ico has unilaterally extended some of its investment obligations under NAFTA 
to nonmember countries. 
4. Reduction in external barriers. Members of a regional trade bloc should 
collectively lower their external barriers on goods from nonmember countries.* 
The degree of liberalization with respect to nonmembers need not be as high 
as that among members. 
In  our  view,  the  first  three  characteristics,  while  desirable,  do not  have 
enough firepower in the sense that they are likely to apply to most blocs any- 
way. Open membership is certainly better than “closed  membership”-a  re- 
gional bloc with a predetermined  size. It is a necessary  condition if regional 
blocs are not to be stumbling blocks to global free trade.  Furthermore, it is 
possible to cook up theoretical models in which regional blocs choose to de- 
cline any new member after reaching a certain size (20 out of 30 in Saxonhouse 
1993; 16 out of 30 in Stein 1994). But almost all regional blocs, past, present, 
or currently in negotiation, have some degree of open membership. That does 
not seem to reduce trade diversion in any significant way. 
Open benefits (to nonmembers) in selected industries are also desirable. If 
open benefits only apply to industries in which the members of a bloc dominate 
the world, as the definition suggests, then tautologically, they would not incur 
opposition from interest groups in the member countries. Such freebies would 
naturally  be part of any regional bloc. For example, many computer-related 
industries, from memory chip production, to hard disk manufacture, to com- 
puter assembly, have been identified as being dominated by APEC members in 
world  trade.  It requires  no great  imagination  to  think that APEC,  when  it 
chooses to establish free trade in those products among its member countries, 
most likely will not maintain high barriers against products from outside the 
region. The problem is that APEC is almost unique relative to other regional 
blocs in terms of the vast number of countries it covers and the large number 
of  sectors in which its member countries have comparative advantage. Many 
smaller blocs may have greater difficulty  in identifying industries in  which 
they clearly dominate world trade. Moreover,  as the pattern  of  comparative 
advantage shifts over time, there is no guarantee that the currently dominating 
industries will not be the subjects of future protectionist movements by lob- 
bying groups. In conclusion, selective liberalization in dominating industries 
2. We  do not distinguish between customs unions and free trade areas. Krueger (1995) has 
argued that customs unions are (almost) always welfare superior to free trade areas. Moreover, in 
terms of political economy, customs unions are less likely to be stumbling blocks to further global 
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certainly works in the direction of reducing trade diversion. But for most re- 
gional blocs, the number of nondiscriminating sectors would be too small to 
have a major impact on the overall trade diversion of the blocs. 
The nonprohibition clause is also a highly desirable feature of any regional 
trade bloc.  But we know of  no bloc that does not in fact, if  only implicitly, 
have such a clause. If a member country of a bloc wants to liberalize unilater- 
ally, other member countries may not like it, but it is rare to see those countries 
try to block the trade liberalization of their neighbors. So the problem of most 
regional blocs is not that members are prohibited from extending the benefits 
to nonmembers, but that they do not choose to liberalize often enough. After 
extolling an implicit nonprohibition  clause in the APEC discussion, Bergsten 
(1994) immediately added that “in general, however, the strategy would open 
APEC arrangements only to nonmember countries that undertake correspond- 
ing  obligations.”  Again,  unilateral  liberalization  as a  result  of  a  regional 
agreement is rare enough to counter the trade diversion effect of regional blocs. 
This brings us naturally  to the last definition  of open regionalism,  which 
calls for reducing external barriers at the same time as member countries lower 
barriers among themselves. Kemp and Wan (1  976) proved that if members of 
a trade bloc maintain the same level of trade with nonmembers after the forma- 
tion of the bloc, then world welfare always increases. In fact, the required de- 
gree of extrabloc liberalization may be lower than the Kemp-Wan rule in many 
instances. Wei and Frankel (1995) have shown that even a relatively small par- 
tial liberalization by regional blocs with respect to countries outside, which 
may still result in a lower amount of trade between members and nonmembers, 
can usually ensure a welfare increase for the world. So this is desirable from 
an efficiency point of view. But how likely is it that regional blocs would do 
this? There are reasons to think that the odds are against even such limited 
liberalization. Import-competing industries certainly would  not volunteer to 
liberalize. Exporting industries may not push very hard for liberalization either 
if there is no corresponding liberalization in countries outside the bloc. Fur- 
thermore, Article 24 of  the GATT,  which sets out rules on the formation of 
regional blocs, does not require a simultaneous reduction of external barriers, 
only an absence of an increase in their average level. 
So far, we have said that the first three possible characterizations of open 
regionalism are desirable but likely to happen in any case. If the last character- 
ization is desirable but unlikely to happen no matter what, then open regional- 
ism is basically an empty concept. We are more optimistic than that, however. 
Using a simple but abstract example, we have demonstrated the following pos- 
sibility (Wei and Frankel  1996): there are cases in which an outright across- 
the-board trade liberalization may offend too many powerful groups; a regional 
trade bloc may be used to break the opposition groups so that further liberaliza- 
tion on goods from nonmember countries becomes politically feasible. In Wei 
and Frankel (1995), we showed that in a world of continental blocs, a small 
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is usually sufficient to improve world welfare. How relevant are these theoreti- 
cal possibilities for the real world? A major part of  this paper (in particular, 
section 5.4) looks for evidence that some regional blocs may  indeed work to 
enhance the overall openness of their member countries. 
5.3  Open Regionalism and Existing Trade Blocs 
5.3.1  Empirical Norm of Trade Volume 
The key to detecting and quantifying possible intraregional trade bias is to 
establish a “norm” of trade volume based on economic, geographic, and cul- 
tural factors. A useful framework for this purpose is the gravity modeL3 A 
dummy variable can be added to represent the case in which both countries in 
a given pair belong to the same regional grouping. One can then check how 
the level of  trade and time trend in, for example, East Asia compares with that 
in other groupings. 
The dependent variable in our gravity estimation is the bilateral volume of 
total trade (exports plus imports), in logarithmic form. 
One would expect the two most important factors in  explaining bilateral 
trade flows to be the geographical distance between the two countries and their 
economic sizes. These factors are the essence of the gravity model (and indeed 
are the presumed source of its name, by analogy with the formula for gravita- 
tional attraction between two masses). 
A large part of the apparent bias toward intraregional trade is certainly due 
to simple geographical proximity. Indeed, Krugman (1991  b) suggested that 
most of  it may  be due to proximity, so that the three trading blocs may  be 
welfare improving because they are “natural” groupings (as distinct from “un- 
natural” trading arrangements between distant trading partners, such as the 
United Kingdom and a Commonwealth member). Despite the obvious impor- 
tance of distance and transportation costs in determining the volume of trade, 
empirical studies surprisingly often neglect to measure these factors. Our mea- 
sure is the log of the distance between the two major cities (usually the capi- 
tals) of the respective countries. We  also add a dummy “Adjacency” variable 
to indicate when two countries have a common land border. 
Entering GNPs in product form is empirically well established in bilateral 
trade regressions. It can easily be justified by the modem theory of trade under 
imperfect competition. There are reasons to believe that GNP per capita also 
has a positive effect, for a given size: as countries become more developed, 
they tend to specialize more and to trade more; further, more developed coun- 
tries have  better ports and communication systems, which facilitate goods 
trade. 
3. For a discussion of its theoretical foundation, see Anderson (1979), Helpman and Krugrnan 
(1985), Helpman (1987), Bergstrand (1989), and Deardorff (1984, 1995). 125  Open versus Closed Trade Blocs 
A common language can facilitate trade partly because it directly reduces 
transaction (translation) costs and partly because it enhances exporters’ and 
importers’ understanding of each other’s culture and legal system, which indi- 
rectly promotes trade. To capture this effect, we also include a dummy that 
takes the value  1 if  the two countries in  question have a common language 
or have a previous colonial connection. We consider nine languages: English, 
French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Arabic, Chinese, and Japanese. 
A representative specification is 
log r, = a,  + I3 log (GNP,GNP,) + P,log[(GNP/pop,)(GNP/pop,)] 
(1)  + P,log(Distance)  + P,  (Adjacency) + p,  (Language) 
+ Y, (EC,) + y2 (Andean,l) + y3  WEAN,,) + u~,  . 
The last five explanatory factors are dummy variables. EC (European Commu- 
nity), Andean in the Western Hemisphere, and ASEAN in East Asia are ex- 
amples of the dummy variables we use when testing for the effects of member- 
ship in a regional grouping. 
Our data set covers 63 countries (or 1,953 country pairs) for the 1970-92 
period (1970, 1980, 1990, and 1992). The sources are the United Nations trade 
matrix for 1970 and 1980 and the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of 
Trade Statistics for 1990 and 1992. 
We employ the panel regression technique that allows for year-specific inter- 
cepts. Unlike usual panel regressions, we do not include country pair dummies 
since that would undermine our effort to detect possible intraregional biases 
(and the effects of some of the gravity variables that do not change over time). 
5.3.2  Open Regionalism and Existing Trade Blocs 
In this subsection, we look for suggestive evidence that open regionalism 
may be practiced by existing trade blocs. We emphasize that our findings are 
illustrative. We  do not explicitly  investigate the mechanism  through  which 
openness (or lack of it) is achieved in a trade bloc. Presumably, the balance of 
political economy forces determines the orientation of a trade bloc. For a sum- 
mary of political economy forces within a trade bloc in terms of its openness 
to nonmember countries, see Frankel and Wei (1995). 
An open bloc lowers trade barriers against countries outside the bloc at the 
same time that it reduces barriers among members. On the other hand, a closed 
bloc would maintain or even raise barriers against outsiders as it liberalizes 
internally. In an open regional bloc, trade creation is more likely to dominate 
trade diversion. So the bloc is more likely to be welfare improving. 
In this section, we turn to an empirical examination of the issue. Using data 
covering 1970-92,  we look at the following seven trade blocs: the European 
Community (EC, now called European Union), the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), MERCOSUR and the 
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Table 5.1  (continued) 
N 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error of 
regression 
6,102  6,102 
0.162  0.787 
1.179  1.114 
Notes: Dependent variable is total trade (T,). Data cover 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1992. All variables 
except dummy variables are in logs. All regressions have an intercept and year dummies not re- 
ported here. 
"Region2 variables take the value 1 if both countries (i and  j)  in the pair are in the region. 
bRegionl variables take the value  I  if the pair includes a country in the region. 
#Significant at the 90 percent level. 
'Significant at the 95 percent level. 
**Significant  at the 99 percent level. 
Nations (ASEAN), and the Australia-New  Zealand Closer Economic Rela- 
tions agreement (ANZ). We note that the seven groupings have very different 
degrees of  intended  integration, from nascent free trade  areas to  customs 
unions or common markets. We  will examine their trade orientations sepa- 
rately. 
As a benchmark for comparison, we first examine the degree of trade inte- 
gration in these groupings. The results are reported in column (1) of table 5.1. 
We  first note that the gravity variables are all statistically significant and with 
expected signs. The coefficient on GNP is 0.8: as economic size increases, so 
does trade. Distance has a negative coefficient: a 1 percent increase in distance 
is associated with 0.6 percent less trade. On the other hand, two countries with 
a common land border tend to trade 50 percent more than an otherwise identi- 
cal pair of countries. Countries with a common language or colonial connec- 
tion also tend to trade 50 percent more than otherwise. 
We now turn to evidence of intraregional trade bias. The coefficients for all 
the regional dummies are positive. In addition, EC, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, 
and ANZ are statistically different from zero at the  1 percent level. For ex- 
ample, two EC countries tend to trade 15 percent more than a random country 
pair outside the region. More astonishingly, ASEAN countries tend to trade 
several times more than the prediction of the gravity modeL4 
We  should emphasize that the coefficients on the bloc dummies in column 
(I) of table 5.1  measure the amount of trade among member countries of  a 
group in excess of that among countries that do not belong to any bloc. We 
note that if all countries in a particular group are more open than an average 
country, then the trade among these countries would be higher than the model 
4. This partly reflects the high degree of openness of  all East Asian countries, as suggested by 
the large and significant coefficient for the dummy for the non-ASEAN countries in the region. 
See also Frankel and Wei (1993) and section 5.4 of this paper. 128  Shang-Jin Wei and Jeffrey A. Frankel 
prediction even if none of the countries has any discriminatory policies or insti- 
tutions. In other words, the results in column (1) do not distinguish between 
general openness and discriminatory institutions or policies. 
We address this issue in column (2). Define EC1 as a dummy for any bilat- 
eral trade that involves at least one EC country, and EC2 as a dummy for trade 
between any two EC countries. Define EFTAl, EFTA2, and so on, analogously. 
In a gravity regression with these dummies, one may interpret the coefficient 
on EC 1 as the extent of  abnormal trade between an EC country and a country 
outside the region relative to u random pair of countries that are not members 
ofany bloc. A negative coefficient implies that trade between a member of the 
bloc and a nonmember is smaller, on average, than that between two otherwise 
identical countries. This is indicative of possible trade diversion. On the other 
hand, a positive coefficient implies that trade between EC countries and coun- 
tries outside the region is higher than what one would have expected from their 
economic, geographic, and linguistic positions. Thus, a positive coefficient is 
taken as possible evidence of an open trade bloc. 
Relative to column (l), the coefficient on the EC2 dummy requires a differ- 
ent interpretation: it now represents any extra amount of trade between two EC 
countries relative to their trade  with countries outside the region.  In other 
words, even if trade between Sweden and Finland is the same as that between 
two identical countries outside the group, the coefficient on EFTA2 could still 
be positive if Sweden, Finland, and other EFTA countries trade less, on aver- 
age, with countries outside the group. We can interpret the coefficients on other 
bloc dummies in a similar way. 
In column (2), the coefficients on the basic gravity variables are not very 
different from before. Hence, we focus our discussion on the bloc dummies. 
In Europe, averaging over the two-decade period, the countries in the European 
Community tend to be more open than an average country: their trade with 
outside countries is 18 percent higher than the prediction of the model, as re- 
flected by the coefficient on the EC1 variable. Once one controls for the Euro- 
pean Community’s general openness and the member countries’ economic and 
geographic characteristics, intra-EC trade is no longer unusually high. In fact, 
it is  15 percent less than the prediction of  the model (the EC2 coefficient). 
In contrast, the EFTAl dummy has a negative coefficient (-0.38):  over the 
sample, the EFTA countries tend to trade 38 percent less with countries outside 
relative to a random group of  countries in the world. At the  same time, the 
EFTA countries also trade 22 percent more among themselves than a random 
group. This suggests that EFTA may build up its intragroup trade concentration 
mainly by diverting trade away from outside countries. 
We now turn to the three blocs in the Western Hemisphere. NAFTA was not 
established  until the very end of  the sample period. Nevertheless, the three 
countries in the group on average trade 20 percent less with outside countries 
than the model’s prediction,  but 36 percent more among themselves than a 
random group that does not belong to any bloc. In contrast, while MERCO- 129  Open versus Closed Trade Blocs 
SUR countries exhibit  an intragroup trade bias during the sample, they also 
trade more with all countries in the world than the model’s prediction. The 
Andean group members, on the other hand,  show no unusual trade  among 
themselves or with outsiders. 
In the Asia Pacific region, the ASEAN countries, which constitute the only 
explicit bloc in East Asia, trade substantially more among themselves than a 
random group that does not belong to any bloc. At the same time, these coun- 
tries are also more open in general as they have more trade with outside coun- 
tries than one would predict based on their economic and geographic charac- 
teristics.  We  should further  note,  however,  that  the ASEAN  group’s trade 
pattern may not be substantially different from that of the rest of East Asia. 
The rest of East Asia, though lacking a formal bloc, also tends to be very open 
to all countries in the world and, at the same time, trades particularly  inten- 
sively with other East Asian countries. Australia and New Zealand, connected 
by  their Closer Economic  Relations treaty, apparently generate higher trade 
between themselves than one would expect based on the gravity model. It is 
worth noting, however, that their trade with other countries, averaging over the 
two decades, does not seem to suffer too much from their cozy relationship. 
5.4  Open Regionalism and Implicit Continental Blocs 
The openness of  existing trade blocs was examined in section 5.3. In this 
section, we turn our attention to a different classification of country groups. It 
has been  observed that many continents may constitute implicit trade blocs. 
For example, it is sometimes alleged that there is an implicit trade bloc in East 
Asia, possibly centered on Japan. Opaque institutions and informal rules and 
cultures, possibly encouraged by  implicit policies, may operate in the  same 
way as tariffs, encouraging countries to trade more intensively with members 
of the “club” at the expense of outsiders. Frankel and Wei (1993) found some 
evidence of intracontinental trade biases in East Asia, Western Europe, and the 
Western Hemisphere. In some cases, once one controls for continental biases 
(e.g., an intra-East  Asia bias), trade within subregions (e.g., among ASEAN 
members)  no longer  seems unusually  high. The continental  nature of trade 
blocs could have important welfare implications that are different from those 
of a bloc formed by a random group of countries (Krugman 1991b; Frankel et 
al. 1995, 1996). 
Following Frankel and Wei (1994), we will consider four implicit continen- 
tal blocs:  Western Europe,  the Western Hemisphere,  East Asia, and APEC. 
Again, what we are looking for is not so much the effects of explicitly discrimi- 
natory tariffs, but those of  opaque institutions, cultures, or implicit policies 
(i.e., nontariff barriers broadly defined). The basic results are presented in table 
5.2. For comparison, column (1) reports a regression that  includes only the 
dummies for within-bloc biases. The results with this more up-to-date data set 


























































































Notes: Dependent variable is total trade (q,).  Data cover years 1970, 1980, 1990, and  1992. All 
variables except dummy variables are in  logs. 
“Region2  variables take the value 1 if  both countries  (i andj) in the pair are in the region. 
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‘Significant at the 90 percent level. 
*Significant at the 95 percent level. 
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onal bias in each of the four potential blocs in question. Based on data for the 
period 1970-92,  two Western European countries trade 17 percent more than 
two otherwise identical non-Western  European countries. The Western Hemi- 
sphere shows a slightly higher intraregional bias (about 40 percent extra trade). 
East Asia shows a much higher bias: two East Asian economies trade 145 per- 
cent (exp(.899) -  1) more than two otherwise identical economies outside the 
region. The group that exhibits the highest inward bias is APEC, with a coeffi- 
cient of  1.15. 
Our central interest is the evidence regarding the openness of these group- 
ings.  In  column  (2),  we include  the dummies  that represent  trade between 
members of  a group and nonmember countries. As it turns out, based on data 
for the period  1970-92,  both the Western Europe and East Asia groups are 
“open” in the sense that their trade is in fact higher than one would expect from 
their economic, geographic, and cultural characteristics. A Western European 
country tends to trade 10 percent more with all countries in the world than an 
otherwise identical country. Interestingly, East Asia is more open than Europe 
even though it also has a very high intraregional  bias. An East Asian country 
trades 100  percent (exp(.715) -  1) more with a country outside the region than 
two random countries outside East Asia. 
To be sure, these results do not mean that Western Europe and East Asia do 
not favor trade among themselves relative to trade with outsiders. What they 
mean  is that, for both regions, the formation of  (an implicit if  not explicit) 
trade bloc has not led to a substantial amount of trade diversion from countries 
outside the regions.  Indeed, the trade blocs in these regions appear to have 
promoted their openness in general, even though trade among themselves may 
have grown faster. 
In contrast, both the Western Hemisphere and the APEC group display signs 
of  trade diversion away from countries outside the regions. Trade between a 
Western Hemisphere country and an outsider during the period  1970-92  ap- 
pears to be lower by 8 percent than one would expect based on their economic 
and geographic characteristics. The APEC group appears in the estimates to 
have a greater degree of  trade diversion: trade between an APEC member and 
a nonmember is lower by 24 percent than trade between two random countries 
outside the region. 
So far, we have looked at a period average of  the intraregional bias and 
openness of the four groupings over the entire two-decade horizon. It may be 
of interest to examine how these indicators have changed over time. To do this, 
we create a variable  “Trend,” which is equal to the year of  the observation 
minus 1970. We add interaction terms between this variable and regional bias 
and openness dummies. The coefficients on the interaction terms can be inter- 
preted as annual percentage changes in the relevant indicators. 
The results are reported in table 5.3. Again, column (1) only has the intrare- 
gional  bias  dummies  (and  their  interaction  with  Trend). Although  all  four 
groups exhibit inward trade biases (as we have seen from table 5.2), there is Table 5.3  Trend in the Openness of Continental Trade Blocs (total trade 
1970-92) 
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Notes:  Dependent variable is total trade (q,).  Data cover years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1992. All 
variables except dummy variables are in logs. 
"Coefficients (standard errors) for the interaction between the region variables and a trend variable 
(defined as year minus 1970). 
bRegion2 variables take the value 1 if both countries (i  andj)  in the pair are in the region. 
<Region1  variables take the value I if the pair includes a country in the region. 
"Significant at the 90 percent level. 
*Significant at the 95 percent level. 
**Significant at the 99 percent level. 133  Open versus Closed Trade Blocs 
quite a bit of  variation in terms of their dynamics. For Western Europe, the 
bias started high (24 percent) in 1970 and more or less remained that way to 
the end. East Asian bias started very high (290 percent = exp(1.36) -  1) and 
declined steadily over the next 23 years at the rate of 3.2 percent per annum. 
Intra-APEC bias started high (130 percent = exp(.84) -  1) and continued to 
grow over the period at the rate of  2.1 percent per annum. In contrast, two 
Western Hemisphere countries at the beginning of  the 1970s actually traded 
27 percent less than two random countries outside the region. Over time, intra- 
hemisphere trade increased at a high rate of 4.5 percent a year so that a strong 
intraregional bias can easily be detected over the entire 23-year period. 
Column (3) reports trend changes in the degree of openness of various trade 
groups. At the beginning of  the sample, both Western Hemisphere countries 
and members of  the current APEC group traded less with countries outside 
their regions than would be indicated by the predictions of the gravity model, 
although the differences are not statistically significant. Somewhat surpris- 
ingly, over the period 1970-92, the point estimates of the degree of trade diver- 
sion appear to have increased for both groups. The change is statistically sig- 
nificant for the APEC group (a reduction in trade at the rate of  1.6 percent 
per annum). 
Western European countries were quite open at the beginning of the sample. 
Their trade with countries outside the region in  1970 was 30 percent higher 
than trade between two random non-Western  European countries. Over time, 
however, their trade with countries outside the region actually fell at the rate 
of 1.6 percent per annum. So, at least during this 23-year period, there appears 
in these estimates to be a steady diversion of trade away from countries outside 
Western Europe toward countries inside the region. Because of their high de- 
gree of openness in 1970, average trade between Western Europe and outside 
countries over the entire sample was  still higher than the prediction of  our 
gravity model. However, at the end of the sample, trade between Western Eu- 
rope and countries outside the region was below what one would have expected 
based on economic, geographic, and cultural characteristics. 
East Asia is unique relative to other groups. It was very open at the begin- 
ning of the sample: trade between an East Asian economy and a country out- 
side the region in 1970 was more than 36 percent higher than that between a 
random pair. The indicator of East Asian openness actually grew at the rate of 
2.6 percent a year over the next two decades. Hence, to the extent that there 
may be an implicit trade bloc in East Asia, this bloc appears to have promoted 
trade creation and openness as opposed to trade diver~ion.~ 
Let us summarize.  Article 24 of the GATT only requires members of a trade 
bloc to refrain from raising external tariffs against nonmembers. It does not 
5. We  caution readers that our empirical strategy does not formally distinguish between two 
possibilities: (1) all East Asian economies liberalize unilaterally independent of the implicit bloc 
in the region versus (2) they do so by  collective regional action or  by  conscientiously following 
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explicitly require trade liberalization. The normal logic that the optimal tariff 
increases with country size would imply that a trade bloc naturally has incen- 
tives to raise external barriers to trade with nonmembers disregarding Article 
24. With or without an increase in external tariffs, one normally would expect 
to see a certain amount of trade diversion away from countries outside a bloc. 
This indeed appears to be the case for many blocs we have investigated. 
One notable exception is East Asia, which has maintained a high degree of 
openness and in fact appears to have engaged in steady trade liberalization 
with respect to countries outside as well as inside the region. Part of the reason 
may be that many East Asian countries are resource poor and have small do- 
mestic markets so that they have to rely heavily on imports and exports, includ- 
ing trade with countries outside the region. A second possibility is the power 
of imitation: openness is often alluded to as an important reason why the four 
Asian Tigers have succeeded economically; their neighboring countries then 
follow these examples with zeal. Another possibility is that when countries 
choose to liberalize their trade with their neighbors, it may also facilitate their 
liberalization in general. For a formalization of this idea in a simple political 
economy model, see Wei and Frankel (1996). 
5.5  Trade Blocs and Direct Investment: Does Trade Follow FDI? 
One issue often raised in the context of trade bloc estimation is the role of 
FDI.  Many authors (e.g., Encarnation 1992) have emphasized the importance 
of transactions within multinational corporations for international trade. In par- 
ticular, FDI may generate trade as subsidiaries abroad (e.g., Honda USA) tend 
to buy more inputs from the home country (Japan) than an otherwise identical 
firm in the host country (Ford). It is sometimes hypothesized  that the high 
volume of trade between Japan and other East Asian economies and that be- 
tween Hong Kong and Mainland China are closely related to Japan’s and Hong 
Kong’s heavy direct investment in their respective trading partners. 
We should note that, in principle, FDI can also displace trade as the sales of 
foreign subsidiaries (e.g., Honda USA) in the host country (United States) may 
reduce the source country’s (Japan’s) exports to the host country.6  Whether FDI 
promotes or displaces trade depends on the balance of these two competing ef- 
fects. 
The net effect of FDI  on trade and the degree to which the high integration 
of trade in Asia reflects an usually high level of intraregional direct investment 
should be subject to empirical examination. We rarely see such studies, partly 
because systematic data on FDI were not available until recently. For 1990, we 
now have assembled bilateral FDI data from  15 source countries to a large 
6. Note that for countries with a flexible exchange rate system, FDI has a minimum effect on 
bilateral trade balance in any case, if the exchange rate can move to offset any net change in trade 
balance that occurred at the initial level of the exchange rate. 135  Open versus Closed Trade Blocs 
number of host countries. Wei (1995, 1996) used the data to establish a model 
of direct investment and to examine whether China is an underachiever as a 
recipient country. In this section, we  augment our basic trade regression in 
table 5.2 to include a measure of stock of direct investment. 
Taking into account the special structure and availability of the FDI data, we 
make several modifications to our basic gravity specification. First, we use 
trade in  1992 as the dependent variable and the stock of  FDI in 1990 as an 
added regressor. With this time lag, we can reasonably assume that the FDI 
stock is predetermined with respect to trade flows. Second, since a few coun- 
tries supply most of the direct investment in the world, it makes more sense 
to look at corresponding exports from these source countries to the recipient 
countries of FDI. 
The regression results are presented in table 5.4. For comparison, we repli- 
cate the regressions in table 5.2 on this restricted subsample. With substantially 
fewer observations (347 now, relative to 6,102 in table 5.2), we can still detect 
intraregional trade biases for most of the regions. Moreover, both the Western 
Hemisphere and the APEC group show evidence of trade diversion, whereas 
both East Asia and the European Community display higher than normal trade 
with outside countries. 
In columns (3) and (4),  we add as an additional regressor the stock of FDI 
from the exporting country to the importer. The coefficients on the new re- 
gressor in both equations are positive and statistically significant at the 1 per- 
cent level. Using the point estimate in the last regression, we  find that a  1 
percent increase in the stock of FDI is associated with an increase in trade by 
0.17 percent after one takes into account other economic, geographic, and cul- 
tural characteristics of the country pairs. This lends support to the notion that 
the net effect of FDI on flows of goods trade is positive. 
The coefficients on other variables change slightly. In particular, we observe 
that East Asia becomes more open to outsiders in terms of  goods trade once 
one takes into account the FDI factor. This is so probably because FDI from 
East Asia to other areas in the world is relatively small and mostly concentrated 
in North America. 
On the other hand, the extent of trade diversion for the Western Hemisphere 
is more pronounced once we take FDI into account. One possible reason is 
that the United States is a major investor in many parts of the world. Relative 
to its position as a source country of direct investment, the United States does 
not actually trade as much as one would have expected. 
5.6  Concluding Remarks 
The welfare effect of the formation of a regional trade bloc is ambiguous in 
general. However, an open bloc that liberalizes imports from countries outside 
the bloc as well as from inside is more likely to be welfare improving because 





















































































































































Notes: Dependent variable is 1992 exports from i toj. All variables except dummy variables are 
in logs. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. 
"egion2  variables take the value 1 if both countries (i andj)  in the pair are in the region. 
bRegionl variables take the value I  if the pair includes a country in the region. 
'Significant  at the 90 percent level. 
*Significant at the 95 percent level. 
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regionalism.” From a normative point of view, one useful reform in the interna- 
tional trading system would be to modify Article 24 of the GATT to require all 
new regional blocs to lower external baniers. From a positive point of view, 
the dynamic welfare effect of trade blocs depends on whether political econ- 
omy forces in the process of regional bloc formation, on balance, tend to en- 
courage or inhibit further trade liberalization. 
Using an updated data set that covers more than one thousand country pairs 
over  the period  1970-92,  we  have  reached  three  main  conclusions.  First, 
among the seven explicit trade blocs we have examined, almost all show in- 
trabloc trade biases. However, their openness toward outside countries differs 
dramatically. The European Community, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN countries 
tend to trade more with all countries in the world than one would have pre- 
dicted based on their economic and geographic characteristics. The Andean 
group and the Australia-New  Zealand pair at least did not trade less with out- 
siders than the predictions of the gravity model. In contrast, the EFTA and 
NAFTA countries were less open to outsiders in the sense that their trade levels 
with other countries were below the model’s predictions. 
Second, when we considered implicit continental trade blocs, we also dis- 
covered differing degrees of openness. Averaging over the period 1970-92, we 
found that Western Europe and especially East Asia were more open to imports 
from outside the regions than predicted by a gravity model. The Western Hemi- 
sphere and the APEC group traded less with outside countries than predicted 
by a gravity model. However, in terms of trend change, East Asia is the only 
grouping that started out open and became more open over the sample. Western 
Europe started open but gradually became trade diverting. The APEC group 
has managed continuously to shift trade away from countries outside in favor 
of those inside. 
And finally, FDI appears to have promoted trade on average. Once we have 
taken into account the FDI effect, East Asia seems even more open to outsiders 
than otherwise. 
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Comment  Taeho Bark 
First of all, I would like to congratulate the authors for their excellent work. 
This paper greatly helps us to better understand the various definitions of open 
regionalism and the welfare implications of regional blocs. The empirical anal- 
ysis presented in this paper will prove invaluable, particularly to those who are 
involved in the formulation of regional trade arrangements such as APEC. 
Since the analysis and the results of this paper are quite clear, I do not have 
many comments to make with regard to them. However, I have found one ma- 
jor problem in the consistency between the paper’s definition of the openness 
of  regional  trade blocs  and its methodology  for measuring the openness of 
regional trade blocs. Let me elaborate on this. 
According  to the definition given in the paper’s  introduction,  in an open 
bloc, trade barriers set by members of the bloc against nonmembers are low- 
ered at the same time that the barriers among the members are reduced. In the 
empirical analysis, a positive coefficient on the variable for trade between  a 
member and a nonmember is taken as possible evidence of an open trade bloc. 
The problem  with this is that the definition of an open trade bloc is based 
on the trade regimes of member countries with respect to outsiders while the 
empirical analysis is based on the trade volumes. Therefore, a positive coeffi- 
cient can imply a case in which a member country trades more with outsiders, 
not because the member country’s trade regime with respect to nonmember 
countries is more open, but simply because it exports more to outsiders. I think 
the openness of East Asia should be carefully interpreted. The findings on the 
openness of the East Asian bloc in this paper could be misleading. 
Let me now turn to a few minor comments. First, I would like to comment 
on the authors’ idea that new regional blocs could be required to lower external 
barriers partially, for example, 10 percent of  the degree of intrabloc liberaliza- 
tion. If this requirement were compulsory, intrabloc liberalization negotiations 
among members would become more difficult with an added dimension when 
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they calculate the costs and benefits. Albeit a good idea, in reality, this proposal 
would be very difficult to implement. 
Second, I think it would be interesting to add an additional empirical analy- 
sis to this paper for measuring biases of trade between members of two differ- 
ent blocs,  for example, between  Western European countries and Western 
Hemisphere countries. Such an analysis can provide at least an empirical base 
for judging whether the recently raised idea of forming a trans-Atlantic free 
trade area is appropriate or not. 
Third, I think it will be useful in the future, when enough data become avail- 
able, to do similar empirical analyses and compare the openness of actual trade 
blocs such as the European Union, NAFTA, EFTA, and MERCOSUR. These 
analyses will be more meaningful because we can examine the effects of actual 
trade blocs. 
Finally, I would like to ask whether the model specification in the paper is 
stable  and  whether there  are possible  multicollinearities  in  the  regression 
model, particularly among dummy variables. 